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ABSTRACT 
Consequence assessment for pipeline damage is exercised to determine the 
losses of a failure event such as human, asset, production and environmental loss. 
However, assessment of reputation loss, which is part of failure impact, is usually 
excluded due to its qualitative nature. Therefore, the need for a quantitative model of 
reputation loss is of great interest among pipeline risk assessors. The available 
current model assesses reputation loss qualitatively; it is a self-centered assessment, 
time-independent loss factors and internal stakeholder’s influence are typically 
neglected. Therefore, the study aimed to develop a quantitative model to quantify 
reputation loss of the pipeline owner in order to improve the calculation of risk of 
pipeline damage according to the four different stakeholders’ perceptions. A total of 
30 reputation loss factors were identified via 30 case studies related to onshore 
pipeline damage accident reports. These factors were included in a structured online 
survey which was designed for the stakeholders in Malaysia to rank the factors 
according to its influence on owner’s reputation based on a given imaginary worst 
case scenario. A total of 200 respondents participated in the survey and the ranking 
of the factors based on the four different stakeholders were obtained. All 
stakeholders were in agreement that the factor which most influences the loss of 
owner reputation is factor D3 “Accident Severity”.  It is the parent factor of D31 
“Multiple fatality and injuries”, D32 “Fire extinguished in longer duration”, D33 
“Destroyed private properties”, and D34 “Damaged of vast environment area”. 
Statistical analysis and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) were implemented 
to prioritize and weigh the factors according to the four different stakeholders’ 
preferences. Four reputation loss models were then proposed to predict the reputation 
loss due to pipeline explosion. Eight experts from PETRONAS Gas Berhad (PGB) 
with 15 years of experience in pipeline integrity management were selected for 
model validation. Model development was presented to the experts for validation 
survey. The result indicates that this model is considered as comprehensive, fulfilled 
the objective, well-defined and practical to be used with a moderate level of overall 
reliability which can be improved by utilizing the model in a real case study. Thus, 
the proposed model was implemented in a case study of pipeline in Malaysia by 
taking the 2014 explosion event occurred in Lawas, Sarawak as a benchmark. The 
value of consequence of failure calculated by the proposed model was 7% lower than 
the current model from PETRONAS Technical Standard. This reduction has 
significantly shifted the risk of pipeline failure from “High” to “Moderate” for the 
rural area. To conclude, the inclusion of the proposed reputation loss model may 
produce a comprehensive consequence assessment of pipeline damage and provide a 
higher level of confidence to the pipeline owner to optimize their risk-based 
inspection and maintenance scheme, hence, prolonging the long-term integrity of 
their pipeline assets and simultaneously securing the company annual profit margins. 
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ABSTRAK 
Penilaian kesan kegagalan paip saluran minyak dan gas dilakukan untuk 
menentukan kerugian terhadap manusia, harta benda, pengeluaran dan alam sekitar. 
Walaubagaimanapun, impak lain iaitu kehilangan reputasi kebiasaannya 
dikecualikan kerana sifat kualitatifnya. Maka, satu model kuantitatif kehilangan 
reputasi amat diperlukan oleh para penilai risiko. Model sedia ada menilai 
kehilangan reputasi secara kualitatif. Penilaiannya bersifat kendiri, faktor kehilangan 
tidak bersandarkan masa, dan pengaruh pihak berkepentingan dalaman diabaikan. 
Oleh itu, kajian dilakukan untuk membina model kuantitatif untuk mengukur 
kehilangan reputasi pemilik paip saluran agar penilaian risiko kerosakan paip saluran 
diperhebatkan berdasarkan persepsi empat jenis pihak berkepentingan. Sebanyak 30 
faktor penyebab kehilangan reputasi dikenalpasti melalui 30 kajian kes laporan 
berkaitan kerosakan saluran paip daratan. Faktor-faktor dimuatkan dalam borang 
kajiselidik dalam talian yang direkabentuk untuk pihak-pihak berkepentingan di 
Malaysia bagi menentukan kedudukan faktor mengikut pengaruhnya terhadap 
reputasi pemilik paip saluran berdasarkan senario bayangan kes terburuk yang 
disertakan. Seramai 200 responden telah terlibat dan kedudukan faktor-faktor 
menurut empat pihak berkepentingan berbeza diperoleh. Kesemua pihak 
berkepentingan bersependapat bahawa faktor D3 “Tahap keterukan kemalangan” 
adalah faktor yang paling berpengaruh yang merupakan faktor induk kepada faktor 
D31 “Kematian dan kecederaan berganda”, D32 “Tempoh panjang untuk memadam 
kebakaran”, D33 “Kemusnahan harta benda awam”, dan D34 “Luas kawasan alam 
sekitar yang terjejas”. Analisis statistik dan proses hierarki analitik kabur dijalankan 
untuk menentukan pemberat faktor menurut tahap keutamaan pihak berkepentingan 
berbeza. Empat model kehilangan reputasi kemudian dicadangkan untuk meramal 
kehilangan reputasi disebabkan oleh letupan paip saluran. Lapan pakar dari 
PETRONAS Gas Berhad (PGB) dengan 15 tahun pengalaman dalam pengurusan 
integriti  paip saluran dipilih untuk tujuan pengesahan model. Ia didahului dengan 
pembentangan pembangunan model untuk tinjauan pengesahan dan keputusan 
menunjukkan model dianggap menyeluruh, mencapai matlamat, jelas dan praktikal 
untuk digunakan dengan kebolehpercayaan sederhana. Oleh itu, model telah 
diimplementasi dalam kajian kes sebenar iaitu kes letupan saluran paip yang berlaku 
di Lawas, Sarawak pada tahun 2014 bagi meningkatkan kebolehpercayaan. Nilai 
kesan kegagalan berdasarkan model cadangan adalah 7% lebih rendah berbanding 
nilai model Piawai Teknikal PETRONAS menyebabkan risiko kegagalan berubah 
daripada “Tinggi” kepada “Sederhana” bagi kawasan luar bandar. Kesimpulannya, 
model cadangan kehilangan reputasi menghasilkan penilaian kesan kegagalan paip 
saluran yang menyeluruh dan meningkatkan tahap keyakinan pemilik untuk 
mengoptimumkan skema pemeriksaan dan penyelenggaraannya berasaskan risiko. 
Maka, integriti jangka panjang paip saluran dapat dilanjutkan dan sekaligus 
melindungi keuntungan tahunan syarikat. 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER TITLE PAGE 
   
 DECLARATION ii 
 DEDICATION iii 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv 
 ABSTRACT v 
 ABSTRAK vi 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii 
 LIST OF TABLES xiv 
 LIST OF FIGURES xxii 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxvi 
 LIST OF SYMBOLS xxviii 
 LIST OF APPENDICES xxix 
   
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
 
1.1 Preface 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
1.3 Research Problem 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
1.5 Research Scope 
1.6 Research Significance 
1.7 Research Methodology 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
1 
2 
4 
6 
7 
7 
8 
9 
   
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 12 
 2.1 Introduction 12 
viii 
 
2.2 Pipeline Accident Documentations 
            2.2.1 Definition of Pipeline Accident 
            2.2.2 Pipeline Accident Statistics 
2.3 Pipeline Integrity Management Program (PIMP) 
            2.3.1 Oil and Gas Pipeline Risk Assessment 
2.4 Consequence Assessment 
2.5 Loss Categories 
2.6 Reputation Loss and its Definition 
2.7 Reputation and Expectations  
2.8 Reputation Loss Model 
2.9 Reputation Loss Index 
2.10 Reputation Loss Indicators in the Pipeline  
            Accidents 
2.11 Major Onshore Oil and Gas Pipeline Accidents 
            2.11.1 Pipeline Explosion Cases (1965 – 1974) 
            2.11.2 Pipeline Explosion Cases (1975 – 1984) 
            2.11.3 Pipeline Explosion Cases (1985 – 1994) 
            2.11.4 Pipeline Explosion Cases (1995 – 2004)
 2.11.5 Pipeline Explosion Cases (2005 – 2014) 
2.13 Prioritization of Reputation Loss Factors 
            2.13.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
            2.13.2 Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
2.14 Concluding Remarks  
13 
14 
15 
18 
20 
22 
32 
35 
36 
38 
44 
 
47 
50 
53 
57 
59 
60 
64 
70 
71 
72 
73 
   
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 75 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Overview of Research Design 
3.3 Data Collection 
            3.3.1 Literature Review 
            3.3.2 Case Studies 
            3.3.3 Interview with Experts 
                        3.3.3.1 Agreements on the Reputation  
                                    Loss Factors Identification 
75 
76 
76 
78 
78 
83 
 
85 
ix 
 
                        3.3.3.2 Questionnaire Survey Validations 
                        3.3.3.3 Determination of Reputation Loss  
                                    Severity Scale 
            3.3.4 Questionnaires 
            3.3.5 Questionnaire Design 
                        3.3.5.1 Preliminary Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 1 
                        3.3.5.2 Preliminary Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 2 
            3.3.6 Main Questionnaire Design 
                        3.3.6.1 Main Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 1 
                        3.3.6.2 Main Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 2 
                        3.3.6.3 Main Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 3 
                        3.3.6.4 Main Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 4 
                        3.3.6.5 Main Questionnaire Design  
                                    – Type 5 
            3.3.7 Validation of Reputation Loss Model  
                        Questionnaire Design 
3.4 Data Analysis 
            3.4.1 Objective 1: Identification of Reputation  
                        Loss Factors 
                        3.4.1.1 Frequency analysis 
                        3.4.1.2 Sample Size and Return Rate 
                        3.4.1.3 Reliability analysis 
                        3.4.1.4 Mann-Whitney Test 
                        3.4.1.5 Kruskal-Wallis Test 
            3.4.2 Objective 2: Relationship between  
                        Identified Factor and Reputation 
                        3.4.2.1 Average Index 
85 
 
86 
87 
87 
 
88 
 
90 
94 
 
94 
 
96 
 
97 
 
98 
 
99 
 
100 
102 
 
104 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
 
109 
109 
x 
 
                        3.4.2.2 Relative Importance Index 
                        3.4.2.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
                        3.4.2.4 Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process  
                                    (FAHP) 
                        3.4.2.5 Spearman’s rho Correlation 
                                    Analysis 
            3.4.3 Objective 3: Reputation Loss as a  
                        Consequence Assessment 
                        3.4.3.1 The Scale of Severity of the  
                                    Reputation Loss Factor 
                        3.4.3.2 Reputation Loss Model 
                        3.4.3.3 Validation of Reputation Loss  
                                    Model by Expert 
                        3.4.3.4 Validation of Reputation Loss  
                                    Model by Case Study 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
110 
111 
 
116 
 
118 
 
119 
 
119 
121 
 
121 
 
122 
126 
   
4 QUESTIONNAIRE DATA ANALYSIS 128 
 
4.1 Introduction  
4.2 Result Reputation Loss Factor Identification  
            4.2.1 Survey Reliability Analysis  
            4.2.2 Sample Size and Return Rate  
            4.2.3 Results of Main Survey – Type 1 
                        4.2.3.1 Section 1: Demographic 
                        4.2.3.2 Section 2: Stakeholder Perceptions 
                        4.2.3.3 Section 3: Operator’s Reputation 
            4.2.4 Result of Main Survey – Type 2 
                        4.2.4.1 Section 1: Demographic 
                        4.2.4.2 Section 2: Operator’s Reputation 
            4.2.5 Result of Main Survey – Type 3 
                        4.2.5.1 Section 1: Demographic 
                        4.2.5.2 Section 2: Customer’s Information 
                         
128 
129 
129 
130 
131 
131 
132 
136 
139 
139 
140 
142 
142 
143 
 
xi 
 
                        4.2.5.3 Section 3: Level of Company  
                                    Reputation Loss 
            4.2.6 Result of Main Survey – Type 4 
                        4.2.6.1 Section 1: Demographics 
                        4.2.6.2 Section 2: Reputation Loss  
                                    Indicators 
            4.2.7 Result of Main Survey – Type 5 
                        4.2.7.1 Section 1: Demographic 
                        4.2.7.2 Section 2: Public Information  
                        4.2.7.3 Section 3: Level of Company  
                                    Reputation Loss 
4.3 Comparison of Reputation Loss Factors Rating  
            between Stakeholders  
            4.3.1 Factors Rating Comparison between Types  
                        of Customer 
            4.3.2 Factors Rating Comparison between Types  
                        of Employee 
            4.3.3 Factors Rating Comparison between Types  
                        of Public 
            4.3.4 Factors Rating Comparison between Types  
                        of Stakeholders 
4.4 Comparison of Reputation Loss Factors Ranking  
            between Surveys 
            4.4.1 Comparison of Factor Ranking between  
                        Stakeholder  
            4.4.2 Comparison of Factor Ranking between  
                        Types of Survey 
4.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
145 
147 
148 
 
148 
151 
151 
152 
 
153 
 
155 
 
155 
 
158 
 
160 
 
164 
 
165 
 
166 
 
169 
174 
   
5 PRIORITIZATION OF REPUTATION LOSS 
FACTORS 
 
175 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Prioritization of Factors 
175 
175 
xii 
 
            5.2.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
                        Framework 
            5.2.2 Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process 
            5.2.3 Priority Vector 
5.3 Reputation Loss Factors Weight Validation by 
            Experts 
5.4 Correlation Analysis 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
177 
181 
184 
 
191 
193 
201 
   
6 DEVELOPMENT OF REPUTATION LOSS MODEL 203 
 
6.1 Introduction  
6.2 Reputation Loss Formulation  
6.3 Reputation Loss Model 
6.4 Model Validation by Expert 
6.5 Major Pipeline Accident Reputation Loss  
            Assessment 
6.6 Fluctuation of Share Price prior to Pipeline  
            Accidents 
6.7 Model Validation via Pipeline Case Study in  
            Malaysia 
6.8  Concluding Remarks  
203 
205 
212 
213 
 
216 
 
220 
 
225 
232 
   
7 DISCUSSION 235 
 
7.1 Overview 
7.2 Identification of Reputation Loss Factor 
            7.2.1 Survey Reliability Test and Return Rate 
            7.2.2 Selection of Reputation Loss Factor by  
                        Stakeholders 
7.3 Reputation Loss Factor Relationship with Pipeline  
            Owner’s Reputation 
7.4 The Assessment of Pipeline Owner Reputation  
            Loss 
 
235 
236 
237 
 
238 
 
243 
 
248 
 
xiii 
 
7.5 Validation of Reputation Loss Model by Panels of  
            Expert 
7.6 Limitations of the model 
7.7 Model Validation via Pipeline Case Study in  
            Malaysia 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
254 
258 
 
258 
260 
   
8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 261 
 
8.1 Summary 
8.2 Conclusion  
8.3 Significant of Research Contributions 
8.4 Recommendations 
261 
262 
263 
265 
   
REFERENCES 267 
Appendix A-G                                                                                                    291 - 311 
 
xiv 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE NO. TITLE PAGE 
   
2.1 A Sample of PAER Model 5x5 Risk Assessment Matrix 
for Oil and Gas Pipeline Integrity Management Program 
(PIMP) (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 
 
 
21 
2.2 Guidelines for assessment of risk category  
(Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 
 
23 
2.3 Impact on People (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 24 
2.4 Impact on Asset (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 24 
2.5 Impact on Reputation (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 25 
2.6 Impact on Environment (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 26 
2.7 Identification of potential consequences for pipeline                             
(Source: DNV-RP-F107, 2010) 27 
2.8 Safety consequence ranking (human) (Source: DNV-RP-
F107, 2010) 
 
28 
2.9 Spillage ranking (environment) (Source: DNV-RP-F107, 
2010) 
 
28 
2.10 Economic consequence ranking (economic) (Source: 
DNV-RP-F107, 2010) 
 
28 
2.11 Third party safety impact (Source: DNV-DSS-316, 2013) 29 
2.12 Environmental Impact (Source: DNV-DSS-316, 2013) 30 
2.13 Assessment of consequence of pipeline failure                              
(Source: DNV-RP-F116, 2009) 31 
2.14 Six Level Safety, Health and Environmental Consequence 
Categories (Source: API-RP-580, 2009) 
 
32 
   
xv 
 
2.15 Loss Costing Guidelines for Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production (Source: E&P 6.54/246, 1996) 
 
34 
2.16 A taxonomy of a company’s stakeholders and related 
expectations (Source: Scandizzo, 2011) 
 
37 
2.17 Reputation Paradigm – The Schools of Thought  
(Source: Chun, 2005) 
 
38 
2.18 Qualitative reputation models (Source: Trotta and 
Cavallaro, 2012) 
 
40 
2.19 Summary of reputation loss model characteristics 44 
2.20 Components of Reputation Index (Source: Cravens et al., 
2003) 
 
46 
2.21 Causes and the percentage of pipeline accident in Europe, 
North America and the former Soviet Union in the past 
30 years (Source: Janssens et al., 2009) 
 
 
47 
2.22 Summary of the selected major onshore pipeline 
accidents case study 
 
53 
3.1 Summary of the severity of the selected major onshore 
pipeline accident case study 
 
79 
3.2 Summary of the extracted reputation-threat factors in the 
selected major onshore pipeline accidents case study 
 
81 
3.3 Identified reputation loss factor and its indicators found in 
the selected major onshore pipeline accidents case study 
 
82 
3.4 Fundamental Comparison Scale for AHP method 89 
3.5 Scale transformation between Likert and AHP Method 89 
3.6 Corrected Scale between Preliminary Survey Design 2 
and AHP Method 
 
92 
3.7 Qualitative Scale of Preliminary Survey Design 2 and 
AHP Method 
 
93 
3.8 Valid return rate of questionnaire for analysis and 
reporting purposes (Source: Miller, 1991) 
 
105 
3.9 Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient (Source: Gliem 
and Gliem, 2003) 
 
107 
3.10 Average Index classification 110 
xvi 
 
3.11 5-point rating scale of relative importance index 
classification 
 
111 
3.12 9-point rating scale of relative importance index 
classification 
 
111 
3.13 Number of comparisons 113 
3.14 Data transformation scheme to pairwise judgment 
(Source: Chen, 2010) 
 
114 
3.15 Random Index for factors in the process of decision 
making 
 
116 
3.16 Linguistic scale for importance 116 
3.17 Characteristic of selected sites (Source: Nazim, 2015) 123 
3.18 Formula of onshore pipeline consequence assessment 
with scoring descriptor (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012) 
 
126 
4.1 Result of questionnaires’ Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
coefficient 
 
129 
4.2 Result of sample size and return rate of main 
questionnaire 
 
130 
4.3 Respondent’s demographics of main survey type 1 131 
4.4 Average index of post-event reputation loss level 133 
4.5 Demographics of the employees 134 
4.6 The influence of factors on pipeline owner’s reputation 137 
4.7 Respondent’s demographic of main survey type 1 140 
4.8 Average index of reputation loss factor influence on 
pipeline owner 
 
141 
4.9 Respondent’s demographic of main survey type 3 142 
4.10 Retailer’s information  143 
4.11 End-user’s information 144 
4.12 End-user’s monthly income and percentage spent on 
products 
 
145 
4.13 Average index of factors according to customer 
perceptions 
 
146 
4.14 Respondent’s demographics of main survey type 4 148 
   
xvii 
 
4.15 Average index of reputation loss factor according to 
employee perception 
 
149 
4.16 Respondent’s demographic of main survey type 5 151 
4.17 Public information 152 
4.18 Average index of reputation loss factor according to 
public perception 
 
154 
4.19 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings on 
customer demographic 
 
156 
4.20 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings on 
customer information 
 
157 
4.21 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings by the 
post-accident product changes preferences 
 
158 
4.22 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings on 
employee information  
 
159 
4.23 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings by 
company’s sector 
 
160 
4.24 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings on public 
information 
 
161 
4.25 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings on 
employee information  
 
162 
4.26 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings by the 
post-accident product preference changes 
 
163 
4.27 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings by types of 
stakeholders 
 
164 
4.28 Ranking of reputation loss factor according to different 
types of stakeholders 
 
167 
4.29 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings by 
different stakeholders 
 
168 
4.30 Reputation loss factors ranking according to category of 
influence 
 
169 
4.31 Reputation loss factors ranking according to all factors 171 
4.32 Difference of the reputation loss factor ratings 172 
5.1 Reputation loss factors dependency 176 
xviii 
 
5.2 Pairwise comparison matrix for Criterion 180 
5.3 Pairwise comparison matrix for Sub-criterion 181 
5.4 Pairwise comparison matrix for Sub-subcriterion 181 
5.5 Calculation of priority vector for Criterion 181 
5.6 TFN pairwise comparison matrix for Criterion 182 
5.7 Normalized weight vector for factors in Criterion level 184 
5.8 Priority vector of factors using AHP, FAHP and Super 
Decisions 
 
185 
5.9 Difference of priority vector between types of 
stakeholders and analysis methods 
 
186 
5.10 Ranking of factors by AI, AHP, FAHP and Super 
Decisions 
 
187 
5.11 Local and global weight for factors according to investor 
perceptions 
 
189 
5.12 Local and global weight for factors according to customer 
perceptions 
 
190 
5.13 Local and global weight for factors according to 
employee perceptions 
 
190 
5.14 Local and global weight for factors according to public 
perceptions 
 
191 
5.15 Expert profiles 192 
5.16 Priority vector of factors between experts and respondents 
using FAHP 
 
192 
5.17 Ranking of factors between experts and respondents using 
FAHP 
 
193 
5.18 Correlation analysis between factors in Criterion level 
(stakeholder-influenced) 
 
194 
5.19 Correlation analysis for between factors Sub-subcriterion 
(consequence-influenced) 
 
194 
5.20 Correlation analysis between factors in Criterion and 
Sub-criterion 
 
195 
5.21 Correlation analysis between factors by customers 
(employee-influenced) 
 
196 
xix 
 
5.22 Correlation analysis between factors by customers 
(public-influenced) 
 
196 
5.23 Correlation analysis between factors by employees 
(investor-influenced) 
 
197 
5.24 Correlation analysis between factors by employees 
(employee-influenced) 
 
198 
5.25 Correlation analysis between factors in Criteria and Sub-
criterion by employees 
 
198 
5.26 Correlation analysis between factors in Sub-criterion and 
Sub-subcriterion by the public 
 
198 
5.27 Correlation analysis between factors in Criterion level by 
the public 
 
199 
5.28 Correlation analysis between factors by the public 
(investor-influenced) 
 
199 
5.29 Correlation analysis between factors by the public 
(employee-influenced) 
 
200 
5.30 Correlation analysis between factors in Criteria and Sub-
criterion by the public (investor-influenced) 
 
200 
5.31 Correlation analysis between factors in Criteria and Sub-
criterion by the public (customer-influenced) 
 
201 
5.32 Correlation analysis between factors in Criteria and Sub-
criterion by the public (public-influenced) 
 
201 
6.1 The equation for reputation loss calculation of the impact 
by investor 
 
205 
6.2 The equation for reputation loss calculation of the impact 
by customers 
 
206 
6.3 The equation for reputation loss calculation of the impact 
by employee 
 
206 
6.4 The equation for reputation loss calculation of the impact 
by the public 
 
207 
6.5 5-point scale reputation loss severity level (investor-
influenced) 
 
209 
   
xx 
 
6.6 5-point scale reputation loss severity level (customer-
influenced) 
 
209 
6.7 5-point scale reputation loss severity level (employee-
influenced) 
 
210 
6.8 5-point scale reputation loss severity level (public-
influenced) 
 
211 
6.9 Reputation loss model 212 
6.10 Relative importance index of factor based on experts’ 
judgments 
 
213 
6.11 Ranking of the factors by experts and various 
stakeholders 
 
214 
6.12 PETRONAS experts’ profiles 215 
6.13 Reputation loss model validation result by experts  215 
6.14 Share price details of the pipeline owner of the case study 217 
6.15 Reputation loss evaluation for factor A1 “Share price 
dropped and market capitalization affected” 
 
218 
6.16 Reputation loss evaluation for factor D31“Multiple 
fatality and injuries” 
 
218 
6.17 Evaluation of Reputation Loss for factor A1 “Share price 
dropped and market capitalization affected” and D31 
“Multiple fatality and injuries” 
 
 
219 
6.18 Increment of reputation loss value by different numbers 
of factor 
 
219 
6.19  100 data of share price of recent onshore pipeline 
accidents 
 
223 
6.20 Pipeline owners’ share price details 225 
6.21 Reputation loss result of each stakeholder for the case 
study 
 
230 
6.22 Risk score for pipeline at rural area 231 
6.23 Risk score for pipeline at urban area 232 
7.1 Percentage of difference of the reputation loss factors’ 
priority vector between expert and respondents  
 
238 
7.2 Ranking of reputation loss factors by the stakeholder 240 
xxi 
 
7.3 Correlation of factor in two consecutive AHP levels  244 
7.4 Correlation between factors in similar AHP levels 
according to Customer 
 
246 
7.5 Correlation between factors in similar AHP levels 
according to Employee 
 
247 
7.6 Correlation between factors in similar AHP levels 
according to the Public 
 
248 
7.7 Stakeholders with similar opinions on reputation loss 
factors correlations 
 
248 
7.8 Expert opinions for validation criteria of level of 
comprehensiveness 
 
255 
7.9 Expert opinions for validation criteria of level of 
objectivity 
 
255 
7.10 Expert opinions for validation criteria of level of clarity 256 
7.11 Expert opinions for validation criteria of level of 
reliability 
 
256 
7.12 Expert opinions for validation criteria of level of 
practicality 
 
257 
 
xxii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE 
   
2.1 Annual number of incident (1970 – 2013) (Source: 
EGIG, 2014) 
 
16 
2.2 Cumulative number of incidents (1970 – 2013) (Source: 
EGIG, 2014) 
 
16 
2.3 Annual number of accidents and incidents in TSB (2004 
– 2013) (Source: TSB, 2014) 
 
17 
2.4 Annual serious and significant incidents in PHMSA 
(2004 – 2013) (Source: PHMSA, 2015) 
 
17 
2.5 PETRONAS PIMP elements (Source: PTS 30.40.60.33, 
2012) 
 
19 
2.6 Illustration of threats, values and ‘loss categories’ in risk 
– and vulnerability management (Source: Hokstad and 
Steiro, 2006) 
 
 
33 
2.7 Consequence categories with their loss indicators 
(Source: Arunraj and Maiti, 2009)  
 
33 
2.8 The reputation loss model of Dutch private banks 
caused by IT-security incidents (Source: Bie, 2007)  
 
41 
2.9 The retail industry reputation model (Source: APCO 
Insight, 2010) 
 
42 
2.10 The retail industry reputation index performance score 
(Source: APCO Insight, 2010) 
 
45 
2.11 Accident frequency data in various energy sector 
(Source: Sovacool, 2008) 
 
51 
   
xxiii 
 
2.12 Craters beneath a demolished three-storey building at 
the LaSalle Height (Source: Gravenor, 2008) 
 
54 
2.13 Aerial view of burning buildings at Richmond, Indiana 
(Source: Burke, 2015) 
 
55 
2.14 Osaka gas pipeline explosion (Source: Akatsuka and 
Kobayashi, 2010) 
 
56 
2.15 Modern shops damaged in Clarkston Toll, Renfrewshire 
(Source: Brown, 2011) 
 
57 
2.16 Smoke all over a burning hotel in Fremont (Source: 
Real-McKeighan, 2002)  
 
58 
2.17 Trans-Siberian Railway tracks scattered upon explosion 
(Source: Onliner, 2015) 
 
59 
2.18 Guadajalara streets destroyed after pipeline explosion 
(Source: Expansion, 2012)  
 
60 
2.19 Search and rescue workers begin operation in shoe store 
at Rio Pedras (Source: Wikipedia, 2015) 
 
61 
2.20 Aerial view of Pecos River campsite post-accident 
(Source: NTSB/PAR-03/01, 2003) 
 
63 
2.21 Ariel view of Ghislenghein pipeline explosion (Source: 
ARIA, 2009) 
 
64 
2.22 Burning oil pipeline in Abule Egba, Lagos (Source: 
China.org.cn, 2006) 
 
65 
2.23 Fire burning Xingang Port after pipeline explosion in 
Dalian (Source: Boston.com, 2010) 
 
66 
2.24 Cars destroyed after Pemex pipeline explosion in 
Puebla, Mexico (Source: People's Daily Online, 2010) 
 
67 
2.25 Ripping roads and damaged vehicles after explosion in 
Shandong (Source: Barber, 2013) 
 
68 
2.26 Fire after explosion of GAIL gas pipeline in India 
(Source: Janyala, 2014) 
 
69 
2.27 Vehicles overturned and trapped in the middle of split 
road at Kaohsiung, Taiwan (Source: The Malaysian 
Insider, 2014) 
 
 
70 
xxiv 
 
2.28 A general analytic hierarchy process framework 71 
3.1 Overview of research design 77 
3.2 The proposed reputation loss model framework 83 
3.3 Interview sessions objectives and results 84 
3.4 Preliminary Questionnaire Design – Type 1 90 
3.5 Preliminary Questionnaire Design – Type 2 93 
3.6 Main Questionnaire Design – Type 1 95 
3.7 Main Questionnaire Design – Type 2 96 
3.8 Main Questionnaire Design – Type 3 97 
3.9 Main Questionnaire Design – Type 4 98 
3.10 Main Questionnaire Design – Type 5 99 
3.11 Validation of Reputation Loss Model Questionnaire 
Design 
 
101 
3.12 Framework of data analysis 102 
3.13 Table for determining minimum returned sample size 
for a given population size for continuous and 
categorical data (Source: Bartlett et al., 2001) 
 
 
106 
3.14 Hierarchical breakdown of reputation loss model 
framework 
 
112 
3.15 Peninsular Gas Utilisation networks in Peninsular 
Malaysia (Source: Oil Peak, 2012) 
 
123 
3.16 Pictures of topographical area at the five selected sites 
(Source: Nazim, 2015) 
 
124 
3.17 Arial view the two selected urban sites (Source: Google 
Map) 
 
125 
4.1 Method used by the customer to express dissatisfactory 
towards the pipeline owner 
 
134 
4.2 Customer purchase preference after event 134 
4.3 The highest contributor of pipeline owner reputation 
loss 
 
136 
4.4 Monthly income spent for oil and gas products by the 
end-users 
 
145 
5.1 AHP process flowchart 177 
xxv 
 
5.2 AHP framework in Super Decisions main window 178 
5.3 A snapshot of pairwise comparison window of Super 
Decisions 
 
179 
5.4 A snapshot of priorities window of Super Decisions 180 
5.5 FAHP process flowchart 182 
6.1 Process flowchart of the results of previous chapters 206 
6.2 The fluctuation of pipeline owner’s share price (400 
data) 
 
221 
6.3 The fluctuation of pipeline owner’s share price (100 
data) 
 
221 
6.4 Conceptual framework of the proposed research 234 
7.1 Local priority vector for public influence factors of each 
stakeholder 
 
240 
7.2 Local priority vector of different types of stakeholder 
perceptions 
 
242 
7.3 The aerial view of deep trenches of splitting roads by 
Kaohsiung pipeline blast (Source: Lux, 2014) 
 
252 
 
xxvi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AHP - Analytic hierarchy process  
AI - Average Index 
ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
BP - British Petroleum 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer 
CGTD - China General Terminal and Distribution Corporation  
CI - Consistency Index 
CNPC - China National Petroleum Corporation  
CR - Consistency Ratio 
CPC - CPC Corporation  
DNV - Det Norske Veritas 
EGIG - European Gas pipeline Incident data Group 
EPNG - El Paso Natural Gas Company 
E&P - Exploration and Production 
FAHP - Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process  
GAIL - Gas Authority of India Limited  
HCA - High Consequence Area 
IT - Information Technology 
KPC - Kenya Pipeline Company  
LCY - LCY Chemical Corporation  
LNG - liquefied natural gas 
MCDM - Multi criteria decision making 
MYR - Malaysia Ringgit 
NGO - Non-Government Organisation 
NIL - Not in list 
NNPC - Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  
xxvii 
 
 
NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board  
OGP - International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 
PAER - People, Asset, Environment and Reputation 
Pemex - Petroleos Mexicanos  
PETRONAS - Petroliam Nasional Berhad 
PCG - PG&E Corp.’s  
PHMSA - Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
PGB - PETRONAS Gas Berhad  
PGU - Peninsular Gas Utilisation  
PG&E - Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 
PTS - PETRONAS Technical Standards 
QNG - Quebec Natural Gas Corporation 
RI - Random Index 
RII - Relative Importance Index 
RL - Reputation loss 
RQ - Reputation Quotient  
SD - Super Decisions 
SS - Sample Size 
SPSS - Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences 
SSGP - Sabah-Sarawak Gas Pipeline 
S&P - Standard & Poor's  
TFN - Triangular Fuzzy Number 
TGT - Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. 
TSB - Transportation Safety Boards 
UK - United Kingdom 
US - United States 
USA - United States of America 
USD - United States Dollar 
WMAC - World’s Most Admired Companies 
xxviii 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
A - the comparison matrix 
α - Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient 
ai - is the constant expressing the weight given to i, 
d - degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (0.05) 
d - ordinate of the highest intersection point D 
f - frequency of an observation and 
Indexmax - maximum index 
Indexmin - minimum index 
λmax  largest eigenvalue 
K - sample with more than two groups 
k - convex fuzzy numbers 
N 
- 
number of respondents; population size; number of rating 
scale index 
ni - number of respondents who rate the importance or 
influence of the factor as i = 1 as “very low”; 2 as 
“low”;3 as “moderate”; 4 as “high”; and5 as “very high”. 
n - the dimension of the matrix 
P - population proportion 
s - the required sample size 
W - a non-fuzzy number 
w - eigenvector  
wi - weight of factor i 
X
2
 - the table value of chi-square 
x - variable expressing the frequency response for i = 1, 2, 3, 
4, and 5. 
 LIST OF APPENDICES 
APPENDIX TITLE  PAGE 
    
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY – 1st trial  291 
B PRELIMINARY SURVEY – 2nd trial  293 
C MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE – SURVEY TYPE 1  296 
D MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE – SURVEY TYPE 2  301 
E MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE – SURVEY TYPE 3  304 
F MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE – SURVEY TYPE 4  308 
G MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE – SURVEY TYPE 5  311 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Preface 
Onshore oil and gas pipeline damage due to explosion, leakage, and etc. is an 
undesired event. Accidents cause significant negative impact such as loss of life, 
destruction of private and public property and serious environmental damage. In fact, 
this event is capable of tarnishing the pipeline owner’s reputation as well as 
jeopardizes the confidence level of their internal and external stakeholders such as 
investors, employees, customers, public etc. In a famous quote, Warren Buffet, the 
chief executive officer (CEO) of Berkshire Hathaway warned: “It takes 20 years to 
build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that you will do 
things differently”, (Rochette, 2007; Vallens, 2008; Gaultier-Gaillard, Louisot and 
Rayner, 2009; Bibi, 2011). This quote emphasized the importance of protecting and 
enhancing the stability of company reputation. Hence, negative perception among 
stakeholders decreases and eventually improves company’s profit margin. 
In the risk assessment of pipeline damage, the impact of an accident in terms 
of monetary value is most preferable by the owner. Thus human, environment, and 
economic losses are converted into dollars to assist them in forecasting their losses in 
each occurrence to obtain risk value in monetary terms. Nevertheless, reputation loss 
is a function of the impact or consequence of failure as well. It can be included in the 
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consequence assessment of pipeline damage as the impact of the accident on owner’s 
reputation is certainly significant. Therefore, the presence of reputation loss 
assessment provides comprehensive risk estimation and subsequently allows the 
owner to prepare an optimum inspection and maintenance schedule, hence boosting 
annual corporate profit. 
 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
Pipelines are susceptible to failure even though it is the most economical, 
fastest, and safest means of transporting natural gas and hazardous liquids in large 
amount (Dziubínski et al., 2006; Carvalho et al., 2008; Brito and Almeida, 2009; 
Brito et al., 2010; Furchtgott-Roth, 2013). A comprehensive Pipeline Integrity 
Management Program (PIMP) is vital for the maintenance of a safe and reliable oil 
and gas pipeline. It consists of a foundation of pipeline inspection, assessment, 
mitigation and communication aimed at minimizing the risk of the pipeline failure to 
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This program has experienced 
significant changes since the early 2000’s. The number of gas transmission pipeline 
incidents had increased over the past 15 years according to the United States 
Department of Transportation (USDOT) of Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) online data source (PHMSA, 2015). These failure events 
can harm the public, the environment, assets and production. The reputation of 
pipeline owners is endangered regardless of how the pipeline had been operating 
prior to the failure event. Pipeline failure has great financial costs for pipeline 
owners. For gas transmission pipelines alone, failure events have cost pipeline 
owners approximately one billion US Dollars over the last 15 years (2000 – 2015) 
(PHMSA, 2015). A well-planned pipeline inspection and maintenance program is 
necessary to avoid pipeline damage and reduce the impact of failure events. PIMP 
secures the annual profit margins of pipeline owners and protects its reputations. 
3 
The previous time-based inspection of pipeline integrity management was 
improved by the implementation of Risk-Based Inspection (RBI). RBI allows 
pipeline owners to choose the most cost effective pipeline inspection scheme. RBI 
optimizes maintenance scheduling and reduces unnecessary inspections. As a part of 
a RBI module, pipeline damage risk is assessed as a product of the likelihood or 
frequency of pipeline damage probability and the impact or consequence of such an 
event. Existing consequence assessments are quite effective in evaluating the 
monetary loss of pipeline failure, such as the number of fatalities and injuries, cost of 
asset damages, cost of production loss, and the cost of environmental pollution fines. 
This assessment does not calculate the actual cost of pipeline damage due to the 
qualitative nature of a company’s reputation influencing factors. This may be due to 
time dependency, difficulties in quantifying factors into monetary value, or lack of 
identification of reputation loss impact on local conditions. Onshore pipelines buried 
underground are laid across various types of geographical surfaces with different 
demographic populations. These various conditions contribute to different impacts 
on company’s reputation due to a failure event. The impact of pipeline failure 
causing an explosion in Europe is different from an explosion in Nigeria due to 
different education levels. Public awareness of safe and reliable pipeline operation 
varies between countries.   
The reputation of a company depends on stakeholder beliefs. Each company 
has at least four major stakeholders, including investors, customers, employees and 
the public. Pipeline accidents impact all stakeholders directly or indirectly. 
Stakeholder post-accident negative beliefs and responses to loss of human life, 
economic damage and environmental damage due to a pipeline damage event can be 
considered indicators of company reputation loss. Stakeholder perceptions and 
expectations differ and are highly incident-dependent. Pipeline damage may affect 
stakeholders physically or mentally and has a negative impact on the pipeline 
owner’s reputation – an intangible asset that could be capable of generating tangible 
loss. Current risk assessment for pipeline damage includes an assessment of failure 
event effects on owner reputation. If a pipeline owner can identify the reputation loss 
factors influenced by the views of external and internal stakeholder prior to a failure 
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event, a comprehensive consequence assessment for pipeline damage can be 
established. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
Onshore pipeline accidents have become common in recent years. In 2014, 
there were a number of pipeline explosion events such as Kaohsiung in Taiwan, 
Andhra Pradesh in India, and Sarawak in Malaysia. Current consequence of failure 
assessment calculates the monetary losses of these pipeline damage events i.e. 
human loss, production loss, asset loss and environmental loss because they are 
quantitatively countable and visible, in addition to reputation loss. This loss 
assessment is assessor-centered and ranges from very low to very high. The effects 
of post-accident reputation loss on stakeholder perceptions is neglected due to 
difficulties in quantifying factors (Khan and Haddara, 2004; Arunraj and Maiti, 
2009). The effects of post-accident reputation loss are vital to most organizations 
(Cravens et al., 2003); as it endangers profit margins (Money and Hillenbrand, 
2006). 
Most industry players choose to exclude post-accident reputation loss due to 
its qualitative nature and the subjectivity of its factors. The factors for reputation loss 
are as follows: time-dependent (Dunbar and Schwalbach, 2000; Bie, 2006); 
multidimensional (Fombrun, 1996); behavior-dependent (Bie, 2006); and influenced 
by stakeholder experience (Spence, 2011). Current practices for pipeline risk 
assessment assume that the cost of reputation loss is equivalent to business 
interruption costs (Muhlbauer, 2004). The loss of company reputation is judged and 
calculated based on fluctuations in share price over a period of time in order to 
simplify assessment procedures (Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998; Money and 
Hillenbrand, 2006; Tonello, 2007; Scandizzo, 2011). This type of reputation loss 
quantification is time-dependent, but affects only a single stakeholder (investors). 
The  expectations of other stakeholders have similar impacts i.e. jeopardizing the 
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reputation of the company and significantly influencing company operations 
(Macnamara, 2006). Public perception prior to a pipeline damage event is crucial as 
it forces pipeline operators to apply mitigation measures. Public pressure for pipeline 
safety differs by geographical location and the status of the pipeline owner. 
Efforts have been made to quantify reputation loss for pipeline owners (E&P 
6.54/246, 1996; Muhlbauer, 2004; PTS 30.40.60.33, 2012). Despite these efforts, a 
model to calculate intangible reputation loss based on overall stakeholders’ 
perspectives, whether internal or external is currently unavailable. None of the 
current available models prioritize reputation loss factors to assists operators in 
responding to the most severe factors affecting the perspective of company 
stakeholders. Reputation loss models for onshore pipeline damage do not yet exist, 
but models covering reputation loss in other industries such as the banking and retail 
do (Muller and Vercouter, 2008; APCO Insight, 2010; Li et al., 2010; Cherchiello, 
2011; He and Wu, 2013).  
As pipelines age and the risk of a failure event increases, there is a need to 
account for additional factors in pipeline risk assessments such as reputation loss. 
The inclusion of reputation loss in pipeline risk assessments makes those 
assessments more conservative. If reputation loss, which is currently neglected in 
calculations of monetary impact, has a significant contribution to total cost of a 
failure event, neglecting it may result in the inaccurate assessment of failure 
consequences. Planning errors for pipeline inspections and maintenance program 
impose additional costs due to unnecessary inspections programs, affecting a 
company’s annual profit margins. If a reputation loss model is successfully 
developed, pipeline damage can be prevented with reasonable increments in 
inspection frequency as pipeline operators pay more attention to higher risk 
pipelines. Great effort is needed to develop a comprehensive consequence 
assessment model incorporating the intangible elements of reputation loss for 
comprehensive risk assessment. To reach this milestone, a detail investigation on 
reputation loss factors is crucial. 
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1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
This study aims to develop a quantitative consequence assessment model for 
pipeline failure associated with the reputation loss of the owner, based on a 
Malaysian stakeholder perspective. The proposed model is unique in that reputation-
threat factors are both time-dependent and time-independent. This model is tailored 
for onshore oil and gas pipeline damage resulting from an explosion. The objectives 
of this study are: 
1. To identify owner reputation-threat factors which lead to negative 
perceptions among stakeholders in Malaysia prior to pipeline damage as 
reported in selected onshore pipeline explosion case studies. 
2. To determine the priority vector of the identified stakeholder-influenced 
reputation-threat factors according to the degree of negative perceptions 
among the major constituents of a company i.e. investor, customer, employee 
and the public using Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method. 
3. To evaluate the impact of reputation loss on pipeline owners by applying 
stakeholder-oriented priority vectors for reputation-threat factors as a 
consequence assessment of pipeline damage, including the prediction and 
validation of the model via expert interviews and case studies in Malaysia. 
These outcomes may contribute to the consequence assessment for pipeline 
damage by exploring a selection of reputation loss factors for future pipeline owner 
reputation loss modelling. 
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1.5 Research Scope 
There are numbers of factors that may influence an oil and gas company’s 
reputation. This study focuses on the relationship between reputation loss and 
stakeholder perceptions resulting from a pipeline explosion by observing company 
stakeholders’ responses (investor, customer, employee and public) prior to the event. 
This study focuses on the geographical area of Malaysia, limited to the stakeholders 
of the country’s oil and gas companies. Unstructured interviews and questionnaire 
surveys are carried out for this study. Qualitative experts’ judgments were 
transformed into quantitative information using fuzzy and Analytic Hierarchy 
Processes (AHP) in order to reduce errors and increase accuracy. Statistical analysis 
was used to identify the relationships between reputation loss and stakeholder 
perceptions. The index method was used to rate the severity level of a company’s 
reputation loss for modelling purposes. The model was then validated via expert 
interviews and case studies in Malaysia. 
 
1.6 Research Significance 
The main challenge of reputation loss model development is to understand 
factor selection in order to obtain an accurate model. This model is to be used by 
pipeline risk assessors for engineering analysis. Previous studies did not include 
reputation-threat factors towards pipeline owner in their assessment of pipeline 
damage. The outcome of this study shows the influence negative stakeholder 
perceptions have on a company’s reputation loss prior to an accident. A 
comprehensive consequence assessment for onshore oil and gas pipeline damage can 
be obtained by incorporating post-accident owner reputation-threat factors.   
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1.7 Research Methodology 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches were conducted in this study. It 
consists of four stages: preliminary study, data collection, data interpretation and 
analysis and conclusions and recommendations. The first stage requires a 
comprehensive review of literatures on pipeline risk assessment and reported 
onshore pipeline post-accident damages in the past 50 years on a worldwide basis. It 
was achieved through literature search via reports, journals, articles, books, internet 
sources, online newspapers archives, informal discussion with experts and 
researchers. This stage attains background knowledge of the topic, knowledge gaps 
relating to the research problems, which eventually produces research aim and 
objectives within a reachable research scope and the significance.  
Second stage requires a wide-ranging literature search as well. All reviews 
are supported with trusted sources to comply with statement validity.  It includes 
collecting data from case study, interviews with experts in pipeline risk management 
and questionnaire survey distribution to the respective stakeholders namely investor, 
customer, employee and public. This secondary data is able to identify the following 
requirements: post-accident reputation-threat factor; the importance of the reputation 
loss factor; the influence of reputation loss factor towards pipeline owner; the impact 
of reputation loss factors on pipeline company’s stakeholders; and validation of 
reputation loss severity scale for modelling. 
The next stage interpreted and analyzed successfully answered questionnaire 
surveys. The significance of reputation loss factors are tested before modelling is 
developed. Statistical analysis, AHP method and fuzzy AHP method were 
implemented in the priority vector calculation processes with the aid of Microsoft 
Excel and Super Decisions. The experts are involved in the validation process to 
justify the obtained values of factors priority. The evaluation of reputation loss is 
formulated later using the priority vector for each factor obtained from different 
stakeholders. The model is developed to classify the level of degradation of pipeline 
owner’s reputation. It is then imposed on the selected onshore pipeline explosion 
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case studies to assess the respective level of reputation loss of pipeline owners. The 
final stage concluded the findings that attain the research objectives and derive 
recommendations within the research scope along with advice for future study. 
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters structured in the following manner: 
1. Chapter 1 shares the introduction of the study. It covers the 
motivation and background of the research, problems, aim and 
objectives, scope and significance of the research. A brief research 
methodology with the approach and method is stated. The outlines of 
the research are mentioned at the end of this chapter. 
2. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review which covers 
the pipeline accident documentations, the overviews of oil and gas 
pipeline risk assessment and the consequence assessment including 
the loss categories in terms of risk, the extensive explanation on 
reputation loss and its definition, the relationship between reputation 
and expectations, the current reputation model and reputation index in 
various research field, the reputation loss indicators in various 
pipeline explosion case, and the prioritization method of reputation 
loss is reviewed in this chapter. 
3. Chapter 3 demonstrates the overall methodology of the study. 
Overview of research design, data collection methods, techniques to 
identify reputation loss factors and the prioritization is explained 
comprehensively. The reputation loss severity level and the model are 
presented and the model validation procedures are described. 
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4. Chapter 4 produces the analysis and results for questionnaire survey 
distributed to the respective pipeline owner’s stakeholder namely 
investor, customer, employee and public. The reliability of the survey, 
sample size and return rate, the demographic of the respondents and 
the given 5-point rating of reputation loss level of each factor from all 
types of survey is presented. The average index and ranking for each 
factor in various surveys is calculated and the significant difference in 
rating given by the respondents of all surveys between stakeholder 
and the significant difference between surveys is tested.  
5. Chapter 5 presented the priority vector of the reputation-threat or 
reputation loss factor using analytic hierarchy process method and 
fuzzy analytic hierarchy process with the aid of Microsoft Excel 
software and Super Decisions software. The significant difference of 
rating given by respondents between methods of obtaining priority 
vector is tested. These priority vectors are validated done by the 
experts. The correlated factors according to respective stakeholders 
are extracted as well. 
6. Chapter 6 transforms the previous priority vectors into a formulation 
to assess pipeline owner’s reputation loss prior to pipeline accident. 
The level of severity for all reputation-threat factors discussed with 
the experts is listed in a scale of 1 to 5. This severity level produces 
range of reputation loss values, which the class of reputation loss 
index is explained. Simultaneously, a reputation loss model with 
ranges of reputation loss index is presented, and the model validation 
scores given by the experts are provided. The implementation of the 
model in the selected case studies is applied. 
7. Chapter 7 discusses the results obtained in previous three chapters. 
This chapter deliberates on the relevance of analysis in order to 
11 
accomplish all research objectives. The achievement of the aim of this 
study is declared at the end of this chapter. 
8. Chapter 8 concludes the accomplishment of the research objectives 
and the aim of the study. It also stated the contribution of this study 
towards the industry of oil and gas. Research limitation and 
recommendation is specified for future study. 
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